Add to that excellent list: the principle-agent problem, specifically the disjoint roles of the consumption decision, which is made by the patient and doctor(s), and the consumption payor, typically the insurance carrier or public health plan.
Classically, economists often pair the somewhat jarring set of healthcare and military procurement as sharing many of the same characteristics: high-ticket, high-consequence, difficult-to-assess purchasing behaviour in which the entity who is tasked with making the go/no-go decision is not the same as the party paying the bill. In the military case this would be a procurement officer (usually a commissioned officer within the military establishment) and the taxpayers generally.
Most of the other characteristics of your description of healthcare markets also apply to the military spending case.
Classically, economists often pair the somewhat jarring set of healthcare and military procurement as sharing many of the same characteristics: high-ticket, high-consequence, difficult-to-assess purchasing behaviour in which the entity who is tasked with making the go/no-go decision is not the same as the party paying the bill. In the military case this would be a procurement officer (usually a commissioned officer within the military establishment) and the taxpayers generally.
Most of the other characteristics of your description of healthcare markets also apply to the military spending case.
(NoMoreNicksLeft made this same point in an earlier downthread comment: <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41192300>.)