> were sold at or under cost price and the markup was on the game sales?

To be honest that has always had a smell to me akin to dumping.

Differences between dumping and "loss leader"?

I'd rather compare CPS to goto than regular imperative computation.

A function call that's not artificially restricted to return to its caller is equivalent to a goto. See "Lambda: The Ultimate GOTO" by Guy Steele.

A continuation is a value that's passed to a function to tell it where to send its result when it's complete.

In imperative programming languages which invariably have restricted function calls, the continuation that every function receives is the address following the function call. This was just a mistake which the earliest programming languages committed, which has been perpetuated ever since, except in functional languages.

The continuations in CPS are closures. Goto basically isn't. GCC's computed goto is, but generally when people say 'goto' they mean the traditional C goto, which involves no closures. The goto analogy is not great for this reason.

A better analogy is that continuations are reified function call return addresses, since return addresses come with a frame pointer (explicit or implicit), and therefore are closure-like.

Does that matter that somebody else ran it for him?

When it is explicitly an appeal to authority, and the basis for the authority is incorrect? Feels like it matters.

And presumably the GP thought that saying the maintainer had access to Mythos made it a more compelling argument. Otherwise why even mention it?

Especially with how they pick (one of) the most likely word as the next one. And the most likely word is exactly the one with least entropy, the least surprising one and giving the least amount of information you can.

> A "random variable" is actually a measurable deterministic function from the set of possible outcomes of some experiment to the real numbers.

I don't think that this was the formalization that was used when the term was coined, given how late set and measure theory were formalized.

When primate family produced a super-primate intelligence it sure aligned with the good of all of them.

In this world we've had an inocculation event against use of nukes. Two were dropped, people have seen how abhorrent their use is and collectively decided that they shouldn't be used.

If in the WW2 Japan also had nukes (and delivery systems for them) they'd probably have retaliated in kind and US wouldn't let that slide too and it would have continued for some time.

In that case >2 nukes would have been dropped, both US and Japan would be hurting, people would have seen how abhorrent their use is and collectively decided that they shouldn't be used.

> In that case >2 nukes would have been dropped

This is a maybe. What we’ve seen so far, no two nuclear superpowers ever nuked each other, as they know both will suffer.

MAD was thought of later and its theory requires that all parties know of each others' arsenal, think that their enemies aren't going to use them first and there being enough of weapons to make end quick and certain. I have hard time seeing WW2 generals who've seen horror and made horror coming to the conclusion that "they aren't going to use it unless we do, so let's not".

If we talking about Meta, Google, etc. code is only incidental to them earning money.

> that they use because they can't get the artillery shells that they need

That used to be true, but I don't think that the case anymore. UA is now striking logistics ~150KM behind the contact line with drones. Regular artillery can't do that. Guided rockets maybe could, but they'd be more expensive and come in smaller quantities.

> US is currently able to wage a war 6000 miles away from its shores

For a rather restricted use of "wage a war". They did not stop Iranians from doing their thing. Bombing alone does not have a history of winning wars.

This way of thinking can only explain externally-visible parts of consciousness. It does nothing to address internal experience of being conscious and qualia. I don't think the internal experience has any bearing on physical reality (P-zombies would act the same externally) which makes this something outside of the realm of currently understood physics.

The internal experience has bearing on physical reality right here, because without it you wouldn’t have written about it and caused these words to appear on my screen in physical reality. It affects your thinking, and hence your actions and utterances in the physical word.

For reasons like that, I don’t think that P-zombies are possible.

Internal experience affects movement of physical molecules in what way?

Having internal mental experiences causes my brain to send physical signals to my fingers in order to type the words "I have internal mental experiences". A philosophical zombie would type those same words, but they would be caused by something else since by definition it lacks those experiences. That would be rather surprising, and it would be even more surprising that the words that the zombie emits coincidentally correspond exactly to the experiences that the non-zombie has.

(See https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fdEWWr8St59bXLbQr/zombies-zo... for a much longer version of this argument)

As the article says the alternatives (that the author seems to favor instead) boil down to "there's some physics we missed" and probably that's the point where we differ. I find that implausible, what would that be? Consciousness quantum field? Consciousness boson? If it's going to be interacting with matter it has to have a way to do that.

Internal experience is an input to your mind (that’s how you know about it), and what your mind perceives affects what it does. The better question is: how can what you experience possibly not affect your actions?

What you do is determined by physical action of neurons. There is no need for there to be someone to perceive it.

The need arises when you consider the complex social systems humans leverage for survival — our ability to navigate interpersonal conflicts and engage in cooperation relies on theory of mind and our tendency to perceive ourselves as individual free agents empathizing with separate free agents.

By definition, internal experience is something you perceive, and what you perceive informs how you act. Therefore internal experience affects outward physical action.

Qualia are the inside view of sensory data and reward signals.

Think about it from an evolutionary perspective:

Animals that step into a lava flow or forest fire don't reproduce. Eventually some evolve the ability to detect intense heat from a distance, and pain as soon as tissue destruction is imminent. They do not have nor need a general understanding of the dangers of heat, or even conscious awareness that they've stepped on a hot coal.

The pain signal compels them, but that is very low level machinery. It had to continue compelling beings that developed larger and more sophisticated brains that are capable of abstract thought and reasoning. Feeling pain is one of the lowest level parts of the brain telling the higher parts exactly what its going to do in terms that permit no disagreement.

Internal to what? The brain is not a monolithic thing, it is different parts communicating and interconnecting. When the connection between the halves is cut, the person objectively becomes two people, but still experiences and presents themselves as one. Observing ourselves is just one part of the brain responding to another, or theorizing on past behavior. There is probably no actual introspection going on inside of the human brain, only the perception of one.

Internal as in that which is feeling things. In this context the physical brain is what is responsible for what you do and feel, but it is not physically different from other matter and it requires no "internal observer" do do its thing.

There are some evolutionary theories why did qualia("phenomenal awareness") evolved. I don't know much about those, so i can't write about that.